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Preface  
 
 
This document was prepared to assist International Space Station, and other 
program hardware customers with the flammability configuration analyses 
required to justify the use of flammable materials in flight hardware.  The 
document provides guidance in conducting the flammability assessments 
required for payload hardware by SSP 51700, "Payload Safety Policy and 
Requirements for the International Space Station".  It may also be used to assess 
flammability hazards in flight hardware other than payloads, as described in 
NASA-STD--6001B, Flammability, Offgassing, and Compatibility Requirements 
and Test Procedures and NASA-STD--6016, Standard Materials and Processes 
Requirements for Spacecraft.  It explains procedures and techniques that are 
considered by NASA to meet the intent of the safety requirements, but it does not 
preclude alternative approaches.   
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1.0  INTRODUCTION  
 
Fire is one of the many potentially catastrophic hazards associated with the 
operation of crewed spacecraft.   A major lesson learned by NASA from the 
Apollo 204 fire in 1966 was that ignition sources in an electrically powered vehicle 
should and can be minimized, but can never be eliminated completely.  For this 
reason, spacecraft fire control is based on minimizing potential ignition sources 
and eliminating materials that can propagate fire.  Fire extinguishers are always 
provided on crewed spacecraft, but are not considered as part of the fire control 
process. 
 
“Eliminating materials that can propagate fire” does not mean eliminating all 
flammable materials – the cost of designing and building spacecraft using only 
nonflammable materials is extraordinary and unnecessary.  It means controlling 
the quantity and configuration of such materials to eliminate potential fire 
propagation paths and thus ensure that any fire would be small, localized, and 
isolated, and would self-extinguish without harm to the crew. 
 
Over the years, NASA has developed many solutions for controlling the 
configuration of flammable materials (and potentially flammable materials in 
commercial “off-the-shelf” hardware) so that they can be used safely in air and 
oxygen-enriched environments in crewed spacecraft.  This document describes 
and explains these design solutions so payload customers and other 
organizations can use them in designing safe and cost-effective flight hardware. 
 
Proper application of these guidelines will produce acceptable flammability 
configurations for hardware located in any compartment of the International 
Space Station or other program crewed vehicles and habitats.  However, use of 
these guidelines does not exempt hardware organizations of the responsibility for 
safety of the hardware under their control.  
 
 
2.0  TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS 
 
 
2.1  NASA-STD-6001 
 
NASA-STD-6001, "Flammability, Offgassing, and Compatibility Requirements 
and Test Procedures" describes material flammability tests and requires a 
system flammability evaluation for materials that fail those tests.  All flight 
hardware used in NASA crewed space programs must either comply with the 
flammability testing requirements of NASA-STD-6001 or be assessed to prohibit 
fire propagation based on the (presumed flammable) hardware design or 
configuration. This alternative analytical approach is widely used for off-the-shelf 
hardware and electronic equipment and is discussed in subsequent sections of 
this document. 
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Note:  NASA-STD-6001 contains several required material flammability tests: 
 
Test 1 – Upward Flame Propagation 
Test 4 – Electrical Wire Insulation Flammability  
Test 17 – Upward Flammability of Materials in GOX 
Test 18 – Arc Tracking 
 
It also contains several supplemental tests such as A.2.4, Configurational 
Flammability (Test 10)1, that may be used, as needed, for further evaluation of 
materials that fail the basic tests or for testing special hardware configurations.  
 
For general-purpose solid materials used in vehicle crew compartments, the 
fundamental flammability test is Test 1 (or a special configurational variation on 
Test 1).  Test 4 and Test 18 (which is not a true flammability test) are used only 
for electrical wire insulation in power circuits.  The other tests are not required for 
payloads or any other flight program.  Test 17 applies only to pressurized oxygen 
systems (Test 1 or Test 17 can be used for pressures up to 50 psia).  
 
The most recent revision of NASA-STD-6001, NASA-STD-6001B, was released 
in August 2011.  This release of JSC 29353 is compatible with NASA-STD-6001B 
and earlier versions of NASA-STD-6001. 
 
 
2.2  SSP 51700 
 
All ISS payloads are required to meet the flammability requirements in SSP 
51700, "Payload Safety Policy and Requirements for the International Space 
Station" paragraph 3.10.2.2  SSP 51700 tailors the NASA-STD-6001 
requirements by exempting materials used in small quantities (less than 0.1 lb. or 
10 square inches in  crew environments and less than 1 lb. and/or 12 linear 
inches for external materials).  SSP 51700 also requires a flammability 
assessment in accordance with the guidelines of this document.3 
 
 
2.3  SSP 30233 
 
International Space Station vehicle hardware is required to comply with SSP 
30233, Space Station Requirements for Materials and Processes.  SSP 30233 
                                            
1
 Test 10, formerly titled Simulated Panel or Major Assembly Flammability Test, was made a 
supplemental test in NASA-STD-6001B. 
2
 Some older payloads may be required to meet NSTS 1700.7B, "Safety Policy and Requirements 
for Payloads Using the Space Transportation System,“ paragraph 209.2 and the identical 
requirements in the NSTS 1700.7B ISS Addendum.  However, the flammability requirements are 
the same as in SSP 51700. 
3
 SSP 51700 currently states that guidelines for the conduct of flammability assessments are 
provided in NSTS 22648, Flammability Configuration Analysis for Spacecraft Applications.  JSC 
29353 is intended as a replacement for NSTS 22648 with clearer and more current guidance. 
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requires materials usage agreements (MUA) for hardware containing materials 
that do not meet the NASA-STD-6001 flammability requirements; the guidelines 
in this document are used for hardware flammability assessment to support such 
MUAs.  SSP 30233 Appendix E contains standard MUA rationale codes for the 
most common acceptable configurations containing flammable materials. 
 
 
2.4  NASA-STD-6016 
 
Hardware used in new NASA programs, including the Multi-Purpose Crew 
Vehicle (MPCV), Space Launch System (SLS), and commercial crew programs, 
is required to meet the intent of the NASA standard, NASA-STD-6016, Standard 
Materials and Processes Requirements for Spacecraft.  NASA-STD-6016 
requires MUAs for hardware containing materials that do not meet the NASA-
STD-6001 flammability requirements; the guidelines in this document are used 
for hardware flammability assessment to support such MUAs.  NASA-STD-6016 
Appendix B contains standard MUA rationale codes for the most common 
acceptable configurations containing flammable materials. 
 
NASA-STD-6016 imposes an interim update of NASA-STD-6001, NASA-STD-(I)-
6001A.  From a material flammability standpoint, the changes from NASA-STD-
(I)-6001A to NASA-STD-6001B are negligible and the current release is 
preferred. 
 
 
3.0 ENVIRONMENTS 
 
Material flammability depends strongly on the oxygen concentration in the 
environment to which the materials will be exposed.  The effect of system 
pressure is weaker, but still significant.  Before starting any flammability 
assessment, it is necessary to define the maximum oxygen concentration and 
associated pressure in the use environment.  Table 1 shows maximum oxygen 
concentrations and pressures for crewed spacecraft in current NASA programs. 
 
The design solutions in this document for controlling materials flammability are 
appropriate for environments containing up to 30 percent oxygen (unless noted 
otherwise in the text).  Past NASA programs used much higher oxygen 
concentrations (100 percent for Apollo and 70 percent for Skylab) and the use of 
such high oxygen concentrations in future programs is possible.  The general 
approach to configurational flammability control is the same at high oxygen 
concentrations as at 30 percent oxygen; however, many of the fire barrier 
materials recommended in this document are inappropriate.  Many of the test 
examples in this document were tested at high oxygen concentrations.  
 
Configurations that are acceptable under these conditions are acceptable for 
lower oxygen concentrations at the same or lower pressures.  Our flammability 
test experience from the Space Shuttle Program is that 30 percent oxygen at 
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10.2 psia is a more severe environment than 25.9 percent oxygen at 14.7 psia 
(the worst-case Shuttle orbiter environment when not conducting EVAs) for the 
vast majority of materials, yet some exceptions can occur.  Higher pressures at a 
given oxygen concentration can result in a more severe environment, depending 
upon the material and specific oxygen concentration/pressure combination.  [The 
ISS airlock prebreathe environment does always bound the normal ISS 
environment of 24.1 percent oxygen maximum at 14.7 psia from a flammability 
standpoint.] 
 
Note:  At this time, it appears that oxygen concentrations will be as high as 35 
percent (nominally 34 percent oxygen at 8.2 psia) for the high-frequency EVA 
phases of future human exploration missions, so material flammability must be 
evaluated at this higher oxygen concentration. 
 
Table 1: Maximum Oxygen Concentrations and Pressures for Crewed Spacecraft 
 
Vehicle Maximum Oxygen 
Concentration (percent) 
Cabin Pressure 
at Max. O2 (psia) 
 
(Space Shuttle Orbiter 
Cabin1) 
30 10.2 
 
(Space Shuttle Orbiter 
Payload Bay2) 
 
20.9 14.7 
Space Station Internal 24.1 14.5 
 
Space Station Airlock3 
 
30 10.2 
Space Station External2 20.9 14.7 
 
MPCV  
 
30 10.2 
Human Exploration and 
Development of Space – 
EVA Intensive  
35 8.2 
Human Exploration and 
Development of Space – Not 
EVA Intensive  
TBD (probably 30 percent 
oxygen maximum) 
TBD 
Space Launch System  
(SLS) 2 
20.9 14.7 
 
1. Maximum oxygen concentration was 25.9 percent at 14.5 psia during normal operations and 
30 percent at 10.2 psia during preparation for extravehicular activity (EVA) 
2. Ground environment prior to launch 
3. Maximum oxygen concentration is 24.1 percent at 14.5 psia during normal operations and 30 
percent at 10.2 psia during preparation for EVA  
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4.0  FLAMMABILITY ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES  
 
The following guidelines provide assessment procedures that allow users to 
evaluate flammability hazards associated with their equipment.  Users can 
employ these guidelines as a similarity basis for certifying their hardware.  For 
ISS payloads, an explanation of this assessment process and its results must be 
included in the hazard report.    
 
When a flammability assessment results in an unacceptable configuration, 
reduction of flammability hazards is necessary to correct the flammability 
problems.  The primary methods used by NASA to reduce flammability hazards 
are the limitation of flammable materials by replacement with nonflammable 
materials and the restriction of propagation paths, either by covering flammable 
materials with a nonflammable material or by separation of flammable materials.   
 
When the results of the flammability configuration analysis are inconclusive, the 
hardware configuration (or a simulated configuration with acceptable fidelity) may 
be tested for flammability to determine acceptability.  The hardware organization 
should contact the appropriate NASA materials organization to determine what 
testing is required.  Alternatively, the hardware organization may choose to 
assume the configuration is flammable and implement appropriate measures to 
eliminate the flammability hazard. 
 
To conduct a flammability configuration assessment, the following procedures 
should be used.  A top level flammability assessment logic diagram is shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
 
4.1  Evaluate the overall hardware configuration.   
 
Flight hardware is often in the form of a “black box”, a container with internal 
electronics, experiments, etc.  Such containers are frequently very effective at 
containing internal fires.  Sealed containers have no vent openings and a verified 
maximum leak rate.  Vented containers have active vents and associated cooling 
airflow.  Intermediate containers have no active vents or cooling airflow, but are 
not physically sealed to prevent air exchange; many commercial off-the-shelf 
electronics items fall into this intermediate category. 
 
• If the hardware is a closed box without vents or power, the materials inside 
the box will not contribute to the fire hazard unless the box is constructed from 
flammable materials – the box acts as a fire barrier. 
 
• If the only electrical power within the box is from alkaline batteries, the 
maximum short-circuit power draw is nearly always too low to act as an 
ignition source.  Recent NASA testing has shown that solid materials in an 
atmosphere containing 34 percent oxygen at 15 psia cannot be ignited by 
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electrical powers of around 25 watts1.  Typical low-voltage dry batteries 
(alkaline, NiCad, lithium-ion, lithium) are incapable of delivering powers 
approaching this value, although larger batteries (such as lithium-ion 
rechargeable batteries associated with power tools) might. 
 
Guidelines for assessing the ability of containers to contain internal fires are 
provided in Section 5.0. 
 
 
4.2  Evaluate the way in which the hardware will be used 
 
Hardware that is normally stowed in a fireproof container and exposed to the 
cabin environment for short periods during use may be acceptably controlled by 
compliance with stowage constraints (Section 6.0).  Fireproof containers provided 
by NASA include all stowage lockers and essentially all stowage bags, such as 
the ISS cargo transfer bags (CTB). 
 
• A full flammability analysis is required for hardware that is permanently 
mounted in a rack or a locker space 
 
 
4.3  Identify the major materials to be assessed 
 
• Amounts greater than 0.1 pounds (or 6 linear inches maximum dimension 
and/or 10 square inches maximum area) in crew-habitable compartments.  
 
• Amounts greater than 1.0 pounds (or 12 linear inches) in other compartments  
 
• Metallic panels and structures are nonflammable in environments containing 
30 percent oxygen or less (even magnesium and titanium) and need not be 
considered.  Metallic screens may be flammable and must be addressed. 
 
• Inorganic materials (ceramics) are also nonflammable in   environments 
containing 30% percent oxygen or less and need not be considered. 
 
• Adhesives (sandwiched between two surfaces) and materials covered or 
overcoated by nonflammable materials need not be considered. 
 
The flammability characteristics of these materials can be determined by 
consulting the NASA George C. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Materials 
and Processes Technical Information System (MAPTIS) database.  The MAPTIS 
materials selection database is available on line at http://maptis.nasa.gov.   
                                            
1
 Excluding materials with a finely divided flock on the surface, such as moleskin and some 
medical dressings, none of which are used in powered boxes. 
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Access to other areas of MAPTIS requires registration using the MAPTIS 
Request Form located on this page. 
 
When using MAPTIS to obtain flammability characteristics, the MAPTIS rating 
must be matched to the use application.  An A-rating in MAPTIS for test 
conditions approximately the same as the use conditions means the material is 
acceptable in unlimited quantities; any other rating means the material 
quantity/exposure must be controlled.  The following key factors in material 
flammability must be considered when using MAPTIS flammability data:  
 
• Oxygen concentration – The importance of oxygen concentration has already 
been noted.  If MAPTIS flammability data obtained at higher oxygen 
concentrations show that a material is acceptable, it is generally acceptable at 
lower concentrations. Thus, an A-rated material at 30 percent oxygen is 
almost always acceptable for use at lower oxygen concentrations.  However, 
since even small increases in oxygen concentration can change the 
flammability rating, a material that is acceptable in 24.1 percent oxygen may 
be flammable in 24.5 percent oxygen.   
 
• Note:  Hardware designed for internal or external use on ISS is acceptable for 
transport in pressurized areas of the vehicles with higher oxygen 
concentrations, provided it is unpowered and stowed in a locker or 
nonflammable stowage bag such as a CTB.  Unpowered metal boxes (which 
may be painted) are also acceptable.  Hardware not meeting these 
constraints must be assessed for flammability at the higher oxygen 
concentration. 
 
• Pressure -- Ambient pressure usually has a much smaller effect on 
flammability than oxygen concentration but it shouldn’t be ignored. At a given 
oxygen concentration, higher pressures are generally more flammable than 
lower pressures. Relatively large changes in pressure are generally required 
to alter a material’s flammability rating. However, the effects are material-
dependent and should be evaluated1. 
 
• Material thickness – flammability varies with material thickness, so the 
thickness associated with the MAPTIS rating should be approximately the 
same as the use thickness.  In general, flammability decreases with 
increasing thickness, so a material is usually acceptable if a thinner version of 
the same material is A-rated for flammability.  However, exceptions do occur, 
so the hardware organization must document such extrapolations in the 
flammability assessment. 
                                            
1
 “Pressure Effects on the Extinguishment Limits of Aerospace Materials,” David B. Hirsch, James 
H. Williams, Jon P. Haas, Harold D. Beeson, Gary A. Ruff, and Michael D. Pedley, 39th 
International Conference on Environmental Systems, 12-16 July, 2009, Savannah, Georgia, 
09ICES-0267. 
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Figure 1.  Flammability Assessment Logic Diagram 
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• Coatings on substrates – Thin coatings bonded to or sprayed on metallic 
substrates are generally not flammable because the substrate acts as a heat 
sink. Most MAPTIS coating flammability data were obtained using 6-mil or 20-
mil aluminum substrates.  Coating flammability always decreases with 
increasing substrate thickness, so a coating on a metallic substrate is 
acceptable if it is A-rated for flammability on a thinner substrate.  If no data 
exist, but the coating is less than 2 mils thick and the metal substrate is at 
least 20 mils thick, the coating is acceptable.  However, nonmetallic 
substrates are not effective heat sinks, so flammability data obtained using 
metallic substrates are not applicable; in such cases, the specific 
configuration may need to be tested for flammability. 
 
 
4.4  Determine fire propagation paths  
 
Determine whether the externally exposed materials (including container 
housings) represent fire propagation paths exceeding 6 inches in crew habitable 
compartments or 12 inches in other areas.  For any given material application, 
propagation from one flammable material application to the next is not acceptable 
and should be precluded.  Fire propagation paths can be limited by fire breaks.  If 
fire propagation is possible, positive action must be taken to control or eliminate 
the hazard. Sample solutions are included in Sections 6 and 7 of this document.  
 
 
5.0  CONTAINERS  
 
The fire containment capability of containers must be evaluated according to the 
amount of fuel involved, container wall characteristics, and the presence of a 
combustion-supporting environment.    
 
 
5.1  Sealed Containers 
 
Hermetically sealed containers have a verified, extremely low leak rate and may 
be filled with an inert gas such as nitrogen.  Environmentally sealed containers 
also have a verified low leak rate (higher than hermetically sealed containers); 
they normally contain air.  NASA-STD-6001 defines sealed containers as having 
a helium leak rate less than 1 x 10-4 cm3/second. 
 
Fire propagation in a sealed container depends upon the container structural 
configuration.  If the sealed container does not contain oxygen or contains an 
inert gas, then it can be assumed that fire will not be initiated. Further, it may be 
assumed that for sealed metal containers with an air (or other spacecraft 
atmosphere similar to those in Table 1) environment, fire will be contained if the 
container wall is at least 60 mils thick. The same would also apply to nonmetallic  
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containers, provided the container materials are nonflammable and are not 
melted away by an internal fire. 
 
For the much higher oxygen concentrations during the Apollo and Skylab 
programs, the internal void space was also a significant factor and generally 
limited to less than 30 percent of the total volume.  However, for Space Station 
and expected Human Exploration and Development of Space applications, a 
larger void space is acceptable and the normal (tight) packing of flight electronics 
limits the internal void space acceptably. 
 
 
5.2  Vented Containers 
 
Because oxygen is available to vented containers, it cannot be assumed that the 
container will contain a fire.  However, tests have shown that it is possible for 
vented containers to contain fires if the container vents are covered with a fine 
metal (non-aluminum) screen or if the vent area is less than 1 percent of the total 
surface area. For other vented container configurations, conditions that would 
lead to uncontrolled fires (such as airflow, vent type, and vent location) must be 
addressed.  
 
For hardware that is not powered while mated to or installed in the spacecraft, 
internal ignition sources are generally excluded from containers. Therefore, fire 
initiation is unlikely, and this fact can be the basis for acceptability. However, 
long-term ground-based power testing must not present a significant fire hazard. 
  
The fire containment capability of vented containers must be carefully evaluated, 
because these containers allow replenishment of oxygen to support combustion 
of flammable materials. Definition of acceptable vented container configurations 
is very difficult, even with qualifications.   In general, minimizing the number and 
size of vents and covering such vents with fine metal screens (using fire-resistant 
metals, such as stainless steel or nickel, rather than relatively flammable metals, 
such as aluminum, titanium, or magnesium) can reduce this hazard.  Minimizing 
the free volume inside the container by adding nonflammable packaging 
materials, such as polyimide foam, can also help.  
 
The forced airflow velocity is also a major factor in the combustion of materials 
inside vented containers.  If forced air flow is not required, it is desirable from a 
flammability standpoint to cover all vents and assess the hardware as an 
intermediate container1.  However, if forced airflow is present, the relation 
between flow rate and flammability is complex.  At low flow rates, flammable 
internal materials burn more vigorously with increasing flow rate (thus decreasing 
the effectiveness of the container).  At very high flow rates, the airflow will prevent 
maintenance of stable flames, thus “blowing out” the fire.  The intermediate flow 
                                            
1
 External factors may prevent this.  For example, the MPCV crew module must be depressurized 
for some EVA activities, so containers must be vented to relieve the internal pressure. 
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rates represent the worst case; however, the worst-case flow rate is very 
configuration-dependent and may also be affected by the microgravity conditions 
on orbit.  Thus, it is essentially impossible to determine by analysis the 
acceptable flow rates for a specific vented container configuration. 
 
 
5.3  Intermediate Containers 
 
As noted above, the intermediate container, which is not airtight but has no active 
vents or airflow, is a very common configuration in ISS.  Examples include 
avionics boxes that are cold-plate cooled but not sealed (and may have covered 
vents for pressure equalization), NASA-provided stowage lockers and stowage 
bags, and most commercial electronics items that do not contain a cooling fan.   
 
NASA-provided stowage lockers and stowage bags can be treated as containers 
that act as barriers to external fire1.  Flammable materials stowed in these 
containers do not constitute a fire risk while in the containers, provided they are 
unpowered.  However, powered payloads/experiments that are stowed in lockers 
for an entire mission (or are located in place of a locker) present a potential fire 
hazard and must be evaluated as such.    
 
Many commercial electronics items can be addressed through the stowage 
constraints described in Section 6.0.  However, items that do not comply with the 
stowage constraints may be acceptable if the case can be shown to be 
nonflammable and capable of containing an internal fire.  Many electronic items 
can be obtained commercially in metallic or nonflammable polycarbonate cases 
and the internal components are inevitably packed sufficiently closely that void 
space is not a concern.   
 
In addition, many small, commercial items are powered internally by alkaline or 
lithium-ion batteries.  Even in a hard short situation, such batteries are incapable 
of delivering sufficient energy to ignite solid, flammable materials (see 4.1).  
Although we cannot completely eliminate potential ignition sources in spacecraft 
on a vehicle scale, we can conclude that internal ignition is impossible for such 
battery-powered components.  Thus, the only potential for ignition is from 
external ignition sources – and can be eliminated by a nonflammable case or by 
covering the case with a nonflammable material (see below).  
 
 
6.0  STOWED HARDWARE  
 
Many small, commercial, off-the-shelf components are used in a spacecraft.  
Examples include cameras; power tools; compact and digital video discs, mp3 
players, and tablet computers; medical devices and medications; clothing; and 
                                            
1
 Stowage lockers and stowage bags for the MPCV crew module are not yet fully designed, but 
they will have vent areas small enough that they can still be treated as intermediate containers. 
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personal hygiene items.  Most items of this type are stowed in lockers or 
nonflammable stowage bags, are taken out only as required, and are returned 
after use.   The NASA Johnson Space Center provides the majority of this 
hardware for ISS as Government-Furnished Equipment (and expects to do the 
same for the future crewed programs).  JSC has determined that such stowed 
hardware is acceptable for flammability (regardless of the flammability of the 
hardware materials), provided it meets at least one of the following constraints: 
 
• Maximum dimension 10 inches, and unstowed less than 1 day/week 
 
• Unstowed less than 1 hour/day 
 
• Maximum dimension less than 6 inches, and always stowed when not 
in actual use 
 
• Used only when covered by crew clothing 
 
• Exposed surface area less than 1 square foot, and always worn by 
crew when unstowed. 
 
Ensuring that these stowage constraints are met would require specific flight 
rules for each hardware item controlled by stowage, which is an unreasonable 
imposition on crew operations.  During the Space Shuttle Program, NASA relied 
on crew housekeeping, which was sufficient to ensure that flammable items were 
returned to stowage after use.  However, the same approach was not effective for 
ISS, because the much larger pressurized volume allowed for many unstowed 
items to be left out indefinitely (generally attached to walls with hook-and-loop 
fasteners).  In response, ISS developed a generic Operational Control Agreement 
Database (OCAD) for control of flammable items on ISS.  At the time of writing, 
this OCAD is currently OCAD 101882; however, OCAD numbers do change 
occasionally, independent of any changes to the content.  
 
The text of OCAD 101882 reads: 
 
• When not in use, flammable items will be stowed in non-flammable 
stowage containers or compartments. 
 
• Non-flammable stowage containers include: CTBs, JSBs, other bags or 
containers made of non-flammable material, ZSR/RSR compartments, 
and designated stowage areas in payload or other racks. 
 
• When deployed in the open cabin for use, flammable items will be kept 
away from rack power outlets, utility outlet panels (UOPs) and power 
strips (a.k.a. Junction boxes). 
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• A guideline of approximately 6” between the flammable item and power 
sources will be provided in crew training.  Measurement in real time is 
not required. 
 
This operational control applies to the list of items below. This list is not all 
inclusive. 
 
• Plastic or Trash Bags (Ziplocs, waste bags, food packaging, etc.) 
• Fabric and Foam (clothing, towels, Velcro, foam packing material, 
etc.) 
• Off-the-shelf plastics (camcorders, mp3 players, inflatable globe, 
etc.) (not laptops) 
• Paper (procedure books, wipes, reading materials, pictures, post-
its, etc.) 
• Bungees 
 
Hardware organizations may use the controls in OCAD 101882 (or any current 
flight successor) as rationale for accepting stowed, flammable hardware (or 
stowed hardware of unknown flammability) for use on ISS, provided the use of 
this OCAD is properly documented in a materials certification, an MUA, or a 
payload flammability assessment.  Hardware that meets the dimension/unstowed 
time constraints listed in this section and is used in compliance with OCAD 
101882 will always be acceptable.  Hardware items that do not meet the 
constraints normally require additional design/operational mitigations to control 
flammability while unstowed.  In some cases, payloads require unique 
operational controls to mitigate flammability; such controls would be documented 
in a payload-unique OCAD. 
  
 
7.0 FLAMMABILITY REDUCTION METHODS  
 
This section describes common methods used to control flammability hazards.  
These methods include replacement of flammable materials with nonflammable 
alternatives and various methods of protecting flammable materials by covering 
them with nonflammable materials.  
 
 
7.1  General Materials Protection 
 
Commercial items with flammable outer surfaces (such as acrylonitrile butadiene 
styrene (ABS), polyvinyl chloride (PVC), polyethylene, and/or polyamides 
(nylons)) may be wrapped completely with a nonflammable tape.  3-mil aluminum 
tape (such as Federal Specification L-T-80) will protect most plastics, foam, and 
cardboard from external flame initiation.  If aluminum tape cannot be used for 
electrical reasons, a nonflammable fiberglass tape with a silicone or acrylic 
adhesive will give the same protection.  However, when an item is wrapped with 
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fiberglass tape, each rotation should overlap the previous one by 50 percent for 
acceptable flammability protection.   Other nonflammable tape materials may be 
acceptable. 
 
For long-term applications, where tape is aesthetically unacceptable but fire 
protection is needed, the flammable surfaces may be coated with a 
nonflammable barrier material, such as a fluoroelastomer.  NASA has used 
fluoroelastomer coatings reasonably successfully for several years; 
fluoroelastomer-coated hardware looks much better than taped hardware, but the 
coating process is expensive and complex and the coating durability is only fair.  
The original coating for this application was Fluorel® (hexafluoropropene and 
vinylidene fluoride copolymer) mill stock; Fluorel® mill stock is no longer available 
but other fluoroelastomer mill stock materials such as DAPCO 2030® have been 
used instead. 
 
The most common nonmetallic case materials for commercial items used in 
space flight (such as cameras, camcorders, CD players and laptop computers) 
are ABS, which is extremely flammable, and polycarbonates, which are normally 
acceptable at oxygen concentrations up to 30 percent.  Polycarbonate/ABS 
blends are also seen quite often; they are acceptable for use in ISS environments 
up to 24.1 percent oxygen.  In many cases, the hardware organization may be 
able to select a commercial item with a metallic or polycarbonate case, thus 
eliminating the need for wrapping or coating with a nonflammable material. 
 
Electrically powered items with internal flammable materials can usually be 
treated as fire-resistant containers.  In some cases, even a highly flammable 
case is an adequate fire barrier against propagation of an internal fire to the 
outside of the container.  As a last resort, an item may be filled with a suitable 
material (such as a nonflammable glass-filled-epoxy potting compound) to 
provide acceptable flammability protection from internal ignition sources; cases 
where this approach is needed are extremely rare.  
 
 
7.2 Wire and Cable  
 
Most aerospace-grade electrical wire insulation is nonflammable in ISS and 
human exploration environments.  Limitations are usually driven by other factors, 
such as flexibility and cut-through resistance.  
 
• Teflon (SAE-AS-22759 (formerly MIL-W-22759), ANSI/NEMA-WC-27500 
(formerly MIL-C-27500), or equivalent) – good general-purpose wire; high 
flexibility but poor cut-through resistance 
 
• Polyimide – no longer used except in flat circuits, because of propensity to arc 
track 
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• Teflon-Polyimide Hybrids (SAE-AS-22759, ANSI/NEMA-WC-27500, or 
equivalent) – good general-purpose wire; lower flexibility than Teflon, but 
higher cut-through resistance 
 
• Tefzel (SAE-AS-22759, ANSI/NEMA-WC-27500, or equivalent) – suitable for 
external applications but flammable in enriched oxygen; performance similar 
to hybrids 
 
ISS also uses a custom silicone-insulated construction in power circuits (SSQ 
21652).  This construction is nonflammable in ISS environments and 
exceptionally flexible. 
 
Electrical wiring found in commercial off-the-shelf hardware typically has PVC, 
polyethylene, or chloroprene insulation.  These insulation materials are 
flammable in ISS/human exploration enriched oxygen environments and their use 
is generally discouraged (PVC-insulated wiring is usually nonflammable in air).  
They may be used only when demonstrated to be acceptable in configuration by 
a flammability configuration analysis.  Commercial wiring inside electronics boxes 
and low-power signal wiring outside such boxes can usually be accepted by this 
method; however, external power cables nearly always need to be replaced or 
protected from ignition.  Flammable insulation is acceptable on wires in external 
payloads that are not powered (including during ground testing) until the payload 
is in a vacuum where it will not burn. 
 
Methods for protecting flammable cables include: 
  
• Covering with a braided Teflon sleeve, such as Goretex sleeving  
 
• Wrapping the cable with FEP Teflon tape (the simplest and most common 
approach – used widely for protecting commercial cables such as USB cables 
used on ISS) 
 
• Wrapping with a nonflammable fiberglass-backed-silicone adhesive tape  
 
• Covering with a sleeve of 7.2 oz/yd2 natural Nomex HT-9040® fabric, Beta 
cloth, polybenzimidazole (PBl), or other nonflammable fabrics  
 
• Covering by heat shrinking a polyvinylidene fluoride or Teflon sleeve onto the 
cable 
 
However, it should be noted that these flammable materials are not really suitable 
for spacecraft power cables and protective covers may unacceptably affect the 
usability of signal cables for items such as earphones and headsets. 
 
Wire and cable accessories such as cable markers, spacers, and cable ties 
should not contribute to fire propagation paths.  Polyvinylidene fluoride or 
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fluoroelastomeric cable markers are generally used.  Other types of cable marker 
material may be acceptable if used in small discrete amounts or covered with a 
clear Teflon TFE or FEP sleeve.  Most types of spacers are usually acceptable 
because of their heat sink effects.  Acceptable lacing cords can be made from 
Teflon TFE, Teflon TFE/fiberglass, or Nomex, and acceptable cable ties can be 
made from ETFE or ECTFE fluoropolymers.  When flammable cable tie wraps 
are used on nonflammable cables, they should be spaced at least 2 inches apart 
to prevent fire propagation.    
 
 
7.3  Electrical Connectors 
 
In air and moderately-enriched oxygen environments (up to 40 percent oxygen), 
the shell of a metal shell connector prevents fire propagation from the nonmetallic 
materials used inside the connector to other nonmetallic materials, regardless of 
the material inside the connector.  Therefore, the configuration is always 
acceptable for flammability and testing is not required. 
 
A flammability configuration analysis is required for nonmetallic shell connectors.  
The acceptability of the nonmetallic materials used inside the connector depends 
on the flammability of the shell material and its ability to act as a fire barrier. 
 
 
7.4 Tubes and Hoses  
 
External tubes or hoses (such as a vacuum cleaner hose) made from flammable 
materials may be replaced with a nonflammable material or covered with a fire 
barrier material.  Clear TFE or FEP Teflon tubes and hoses are readily available 
to replace flammable materials. If flammable tubes or hoses must be used, the 
exterior can be protected by a covering of 7.2 oz/yd2 natural Nomex HT-9040®, 
PBI, Beta cloth, or other nonflammable fabric.   In such cases, the potential for 
ignition of the tube walls from the inside must be addressed. 
 
Tubing and hoses used in medical experiments are usually flammable and 
cannot be replaced or covered without compromising the experiment.  Such 
hardware can usually be accepted as complying with the stowage guidelines in 
Section 6. 
 
 
7.5 Hook and Loop Fasteners  
 
Although some hook-and-loop fastener materials are less flammable than others, 
all common types of hook and loop fasteners are flammable in spacecraft 
habitable areas.  To prevent long flame propagation paths, the following usage 
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limits are generally applied to hook and loop fasteners in habitable areas1:                 
 
• Maximum size: 4 square inches, individually or in pieces 
  
• Maximum length: 4 inches  
 
• Minimum separation distance: 2 inches in any direction from another piece  
 
With these controls, flammability is not a factor in selection of hook-and-loop 
fastener materials.  NASA normally uses nylon hook-and-loop fasteners in 
habitable areas, because of their significantly greater durability than hook-and-
loop fasteners made from other materials.  Nomex® hook-and-loop fasteners are 
commonly used for EVA operations, because they have good low-temperature 
performance.  Several brands of both have been qualified for flight. 
 
 
7.6  Stowage Bags and Lockers  
 
Metal stowage lockers that do not contain ignition sources are acceptable without 
reservation.   Material selection criteria for nonmetallic stowage lockers must be 
based on fire containment capability and should be supported by test data. 
Acceptable stowage bags may be constructed from the following fabrics:    
 
• Beta cloth  
 
• Natural Nomex HT-9040® of weight at least 7.2 ounces/square yard  
 
• PBI  
 
• Other flame-retardant fabrics  
 
The following are examples of acceptable stowage bags:  
 
Beta cloth bags -- a bag made of Beta cloth is acceptable for stowage of 
potentially flammable materials. The disadvantages of Beta cloth are its low 
durability and a tendency to shed glass fibers.   However, Beta cloth is 
nonflammable at very high oxygen concentrations. 
 
Nomex® bags -- Bags made of natural Nomex HT-9040® fabric are acceptable 
for oxygen concentrations up to 30 percent and are widely used in ISS.  Lighter 
weights of natural Nomex® are acceptable in double layers.  Other forms of 
Nomex® may be acceptable, but their flammability must be verified through 
MAPTIS or by test.  Some of these forms have been used extensively for ISS, but 
                                            
1
 These usage limits have been demonstrated acceptable in atmospheres up to 30 percent 
oxygen but have not yet been tested for the higher oxygen concentrations expected for EVA-
intensive Human Exploration and Development of Space operations. 
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availability is sometimes an issue (the ISS second-generation redesigned CTBs 
were made from Combo® Nomex® but the manufacturer ceased production 
shortly after).  Navy blue single-layer Nomex® weighing 6.5 ounces/square yard 
and treated with ammonia dihydrogen phosphate fire retardant was used 
extensively on the Space Shuttle; however, its use is discouraged for ISS, 
because the fabric cannot be wiped down without removing the fire retardant.   
 
These containers, made of nonflammable nonmetallic materials, can have 
flammable items stowed inside them provided they do not contain ignition 
sources (such as electrical power) and are not susceptible to spontaneous 
ignition or chemical reaction.    
 
Note:  Most stowage bags and lockers contain foam assemblies as part of the 
packaging.  The most common foam packaging materials, polyurethane and 
polyethylene foams are highly flammable.  These materials are acceptable if they 
stay inside the container, no ignition sources are present, and the container is 
opened only briefly.  If the container may be left open for significant periods or the 
foam is likely to be taken out of the container, it should be covered with a single 
layer of natural Nomex HT-9040®; the Nomex® is commonly used even when fire 
protection is not required, because it facilitates insertion and removal of 
hardware.  A commercially-available Kynar foam, Zotek F30®, is nonflammable 
up to 45 percent oxygen and can be used in place of polyurethane and 
polyethylene foams without any need for the operational constraints or the 
Nomex® coating. 
 
 
7.7  Thermal Control Blankets  
 
Thermal control blankets are the most widely used potentially flammable external 
materials. These blankets typically contain 12 to 40 layers of film (0.0005 to 0.002 
inches in thickness) separated by some type of scrim cloth. Blanket materials are 
usually constructed of metal-coated polyethylene terephthalate or polyimide film 
with an organic separator scrim.  For durability, the inner and outer layers are 
generally heavier than the internal layers.  The outer layer has controlled optical 
properties and is usually polyimide, silver-Teflon, or Beta cloth. 
 
Acceptable thermal control blankets are typically constructed as follows:  
 
a. The outer layer is made of nonflammable material such as polyimide film (at 
least 1.5 mil thick), silver-Teflon, or Beta cloth.  
 
b. Internal layers can be a combination of flammable films or scrims.  
 
c. Edges are hemmed or suitably finished so that the inner flammable layers 
are protected  
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For long-term exposure to low-earth-orbit environments, erosion of outer surfaces 
by atomic oxygen must also be considered. 
 
 
7.8  Composites and Fiber-Reinforced Laminates  
 
Graphite-epoxy composite structures are generally nonflammable in atmospheres 
up to the ISS 24.1 percent oxygen but marginal for flammability in spacecraft 
atmospheres containing 30 percent oxygen and above.  For spacecraft 
atmospheres containing above 24.1 percent oxygen, they should be protected or 
their flammability characteristics verified by test.   Bismaleimide-based carbon 
composites have not been widely tested, but the bismaleimide resin is similar to 
polyimides so they are likely to be nonflammable in all environments listed in 
Table 1. 
 
Fiber-reinforced laminates can be more flammable than graphite-based 
composites. The flammability characteristics of thin laminates should be verified 
by test, or the laminates should be protected.   Flammable laminates may be 
used in external payloads, provided that ignition sources (electrical wires, 
heaters, etc.) are not located within 6 inches of the laminates.  Otherwise, 
firebreaks should be placed on the exposed surfaces of these laminates at 12-
inch intervals.  Aluminum tape 3 mils thick and 3 inches wide (per Federal 
Specification L-T-80) is an acceptable fire break when applied to the laminate 
surface at 12-inch intervals.    
 
 
8.0  TEST EXAMPLES 
 
The following test examples show some design solutions for protecting 
flammable materials that have been demonstrated by test. These examples, 
together with the guidelines in earlier sections, can be used to assess the fire risk 
of other configurations.  Most hardware configurations can be assessed by 
similarity without the need for testing.   
 
 
8.1 Materials Selection 
 
The ISS Program initially selected a portable mini Bluetooth speaker system with 
an ABS case.  Since this speaker system is expected to be left out in the ISS 
vehicle for long periods, flammability cannot be adequately controlled through 
stowage.  The Bluetooth speaker burned completely when tested for flammability 
in 24.1 percent oxygen at 14.7 psia (see test reference 1).  A comparable 
Bluetooth speaker from another manufacturer has an aluminum case and was 
undamaged and still operated after flammability testing in similar conditions (see 
test reference 2).  Figure 2 shows the Bluetooth speaker with the ABS case 
before and after test and the Bluetooth speaker with the aluminum case after test.  
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Note:  These results should not be interpreted as suggesting either Bluetooth 
speaker is superior for general purpose use on the ground.  Flammability is not a 
real discriminator when selecting such items for ground use – only in the 
specialized spacecraft environment. 
 
 
8.2  Aluminum Tape Overwrap  
 
A battery powered screwdriver was tested to demonstrate the effectiveness of 3-
mil aluminum tape as a fire barrier in 30 percent oxygen at 10.0 psia (see test 
reference 3). The plastic-cased screwdriver burned completely when tested 
unprotected, but was unaffected when tested wrapped with the tape. Figure 3 
shows the pretest and post-test conditions of the screwdriver with and without 
tape protection.  
 
NASA also tested a disposable dish rack with a cardboard outer case 
overwrapped with 3-mil aluminum tape (see test reference 4).  Only the area near 
the igniter was scorched; the rest of the container was unaffected. Figure 4 
shows the pretest and post-test conditions of the dish rack.   
 
 
8.3  Nomex® Sleeve Covering  
 
A flammable silicone rubber vacuum cleaner hose was covered with a sleeve of 
double-layer natural Nomex HT-9040® and tested for flammability at 25.9 percent 
oxygen (see test reference 5). This sleeve provided the hose with enough 
protection so that only a small area of the Nomex® sleeve was scorched.  Figure 
5 shows the pretest and post-test conditions of the hose.   A single layer of 
Nomex HT-9040® would provide an acceptable fire barrier for this application. 
 
NASA has also tested double-layer natural Nomex HT-9040® bags. The wet wipe 
dispenser is made of double-layer Nomex® and is normally filled with wet wipes. 
When tested at 25.9 percent oxygen at 14.3 psia, flame scorched the area 
surrounding the igniter. Figure 6 shows the pretest and post-test conditions of this 
bag (see test reference 6).                
 
 
8.4  Sealed Containers 
 
A few tests have been conducted on internal ignition of inert-gas-filled sealed 
containers. The ignition source was internal electrical wiring, electrically 
overloaded until the wire insulation fused (the standard NASA-STD-6001 igniter 
was not used, because it does not burn in the absence of oxygen).  As expected, 
(see test reference 7 for an example), even when highly flammable materials 
were present inside the container, nothing ignited and the only damage was from 
the electrical overload.  
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(a) ABS speaker pretest                              (b) ABS Speaker posttest 
 
                                                   
 
                                         (c) Aluminum speaker posttest 
 
Figure 2.  Bluetooth Speakers 
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a.  Pretest (no aluminum tape) 
 
 
 
 
b.  Posttest, no aluminum tape 
 
 
 
 
c.  Protected by 3-mil aluminum tape 
 
 
Figure 3.  Battery Powered Screwdriver 
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a. Pretest 
 
 
 
 
b. Posttest 
 
 
Figure 4. Disposable Dish Rack Overwrapped with 3-mil Aluminum Tape  
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a. Pretest 
 
 
 
 
b. Posttest 
 
Figure 5. Flammable Hose Protected by Natural Nomex HT-9040  
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a. Pretest 
 
 
 
 
b. Posttest 
 
 
Figure 6. Wet Wipe Dispenser (Double-Layer Natural Nomex HT-9040) 
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Several tests have been conducted on sealed containers that were not filled with 
inert gases.  An example is the Apollo program master events sequence 
controller.   This item was tested with an internal atmosphere of 100 percent 
oxygen at 16 psia, using a standard NASA-STD-6001 igniter (see test reference 
8).  Although all internal polymeric materials were flammable in this atmosphere, 
the resultant fire was contained with minor internal damage from local surface 
burning of the room-temperature vulcanizing silicone rubber coating on the 
circuitry and components (Figure 7).   The container internal void space for this 
test was approximately 30 percent.  One hundred percent oxygen at 16 psia is a 
far more demanding environment than for Space Station and human exploration 
of space. 
 
 
8.5  Vented Containers  
 
The Space Shuttle inertial measurement unit was a formed aluminum box 
containing polyurethane-coated circuit boards, chloroprene vent hoses, MIL-W-
810441 polyalkene-insulated wire, and about 20 percent void space.  The 
polyurethane coating, chloroprene hoses, and polyalkene-insulated wire are all 
flammable.  The inertial measurement unit was tested for internal flammability in 
25.9 percent oxygen at 14.3 psia and in 30 percent oxygen at 10.0 psia at its 
normal cooling flow rate of 6.3 standard cubic feet per minute (scfm) (see test 
reference 9).  The unit passed both flammability tests with minimal damage.  
 
Figure 8 shows the pretest and post-test conditions of this unit.      
 
A proximity switch box constructed of sheet metal was also tested (see test 
reference 10). This box contained electrical components, polyurethane-coated 
circuit boards, and 50 percent void space.  Flammability tests were conducted 
with a gas flow rate of 1.1 scfm in 25.9 percent oxygen at 14.3 psia, and in 30 
percent oxygen at 10.0 psia. This unit also passed both flammability tests with 
minimal damage.  Figure 9 shows the pretest and post-test conditions of this unit.      
 
An additional series of tests was conducted to evaluate the effects of air flow and 
air flow rates on the flammability of worst-case items contained in typical 
electronic boxes (see test references 11 and 12).  These tests were performed in 
30 percent oxygen at 10.0 psia, using relatively high flow rates of 6.5 to 20.0 
scfm. The boxes were constructed of sheet metal and the following internal 
materials, all of which are highly flammable in this atmosphere: 
 
Polyurethane packing foam  
 
• Plastic sheet, laminated, copper-clad GE uncoated circuit boards 
 
                                            
1
 MIL-W-81044 has been replaced by SAE-AS-81044 but the Shuttle wiring was purchased to the 
original military specification. 
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a. Pretest, cover in place 
 
 
 
 
b.  Pretest, cover removed to show electronics 
 
 
 
 
c.  Posttest, cover removed after testing 
 
 
Figure 7. Apollo Master Events Sequence Controller 
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a.  Pretest, case in place 
 
 
 
 
b.  Pretest, case removed 
 
 
 
 
c.  Posttest, minimal internal damage 
 
 
Figure 8. Space Shuttle Inertial Measurement Unit  
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a.  External view, pretest 
 
 
 
 
b.  Internal view, pretest 
 
 
 
 
c.  Internal view, case removed after test 
 
 
Figure 9.  Space Shuttle Proximity Switch Box 
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• MIL-W-81044 polyalkene-insulated electrical wire.  
 
Figure 10 shows a typical electronic box used in this type of testing.  Testing was 
conducted using standard NASA-STD-6001 igniters.  Although the internal 
materials ignited and burned readily in these tests, the fire was contained in the 
boxes in all cases except one.  In this one test, conducted at a flow rate of 15 
scfm, the polyurethane foam burned sufficiently vigorously to ignite the large (6-
inch diameter) aluminum vent screen and fire escaped outside the box (see 
Figure 11).  Additional tests on the same box configuration demonstrated 
containment of the fire at lower and higher air velocities (10 scfm and below; 20 
scfm and above). At velocities below 10 scfm and above 20 scfm, the unit is an 
effective container; however, at intermediate velocities, it is not.  These results 
illustrate the difficulty of generalizing the effects of flow velocity on the ability of 
vented containers to contain fires. 
 
The vent in this test was very large (although corresponding to only about 1 
percent of the total surface area) and the aluminum screen was only partially 
consumed.  Despite the high flammability of the internal materials, all fires would 
have been contained if a more fire-resistant material than aluminum had been 
used (such as stainless steel or nickel).  The aluminum screen is a poor choice 
from a flammability standpoint, but would probably have survived if it had been 
significantly smaller. 
 
A far more recent example of a vented container test is the testing conducted on 
the power inverter for ISS.  The power inverter units flown on ISS are an off-the-
shelf design that takes standard ISS direct current (DC) power (120 volts or 28 
volts DC) and converts it to standard household 110 volts alternating current (AC) 
so that commercial off-the-shelf electrical hardware can be powered directly.  The 
flight units have a custom metallic case with additional 110 volt outlets but the 
unmodified commercial unit also has a metallic case and was used for 
flammability testing.  The inverter is air-cooled; the cooling fan was powered 
during the flammability testing but the inverter electronics were not.  The internal 
materials were unidentified but assumed to be flammable in the test environment 
of 24.1 percent oxygen at 14.7 psia.   
 
Inverter flammability testing was conducted with the standard flammability test 
igniter located so the igniter flame would impinge on likely flammable materials 
(see test reference 13).  Three tests were conducted with no sign of ignition 
beyond the igniter (in an initial test, the igniter itself failed to ignite because the air 
flow from the cooling fan continuously “blew it out”; the igniter had to be relocated 
outside the direct air flow to maintain a flame).  Figure 12 shows the inverter prior 
to test and the inverter interior after the three flammability tests; damage is barely 
detectable (the igniter can be seen in its final location). 
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Figure 10.  Typical Aluminum Electronics Box for Airflow Tests 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.  Damaged Aluminum Vent Screen from Airflow Tests 
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a.  External view, pretest 
 
 
 
 
b.  Internal view, case removed after test 
 
Figure 12. ISS Power Inverter Flammability Test 
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8.6  Intermediate Containers 
 
Simulated MPCV avionics boxes were tested in an environment of 40 percent 
oxygen at 14.7 psia to demonstrate that fire suppression capability was not 
required because any internal fire would self-extinguish even at a much higher 
oxygen concentration than the worst-case MPCV environment of 30 percent 
oxygen at 10.2 psia (see test reference 14).  The simulated boxes were 
fabricated from 6061 aluminum, thickness less than 0.1 inches, and with Gore® 
Protective Adhesive Vents for pressure equalization Figure 13a).  Initial tests 
were conducted with electronic circuitry and polyurethane foam inside the box; 
the ribbon cable and foam ignited but self-extinguished within about 30 seconds 
without anything other than smoke propagating outside the box (Figure 13b).  
The test was repeated with nothing inside the box except polyurethane foam and 
free volumes inside the box of 60 and 80 percent; in both cases, the polyurethane 
foam ignited but self-extinguished with relatively little material consumed (Figure 
13c). 
 
This testing demonstrates that it is essentially impossible to propagate a fire 
outside a nonflammable container when there is no forced convection for 
atmosphere exchange. 
 
The Apollo entry monitor system and the Apollo rotational controller assembly 
were tested in 100 percent oxygen at 6.2 and 16.5 psia (see test references 15 
and 16). The entry monitor system is a metal box containing circuit boards, a 
power supply, etc.  When ignited, it burned for over 4 minutes and reached a 
peak internal temperature of 1250 °F.   The rotational controller assembly is a 
hand controller-type device (with a silicone rubber boot over the handle opening 
to form a dust seal) containing polyurethane-coated circuit boards.  When ignited, 
this unit burned for 3 minutes and reached an internal temperature of 1280 °F.  
However, both of these units contained the resulting fire.  Figure 14 shows the 
pretest and post-test conditions of the entry monitor system and Figure 15 shows 
the pretest and post-test conditions of the rotational controller assembly. 
 
A more recent example of the effectiveness of such unsealed containers is the 
camcorders flown on the Space Shuttle.  Essentially all commercial off-the-shelf 
camcorders have an ABS case.  ABS is flammable in air and burns vigorously in 
enriched oxygen.  However, internal ignition testing of a camcorder in 30 percent 
oxygen at 10.2 psia, using a standard NASA-STD-6001 igniter, showed that the 
case did not ignite and contained the fire (see test reference 17).  The only 
damage to the case was some sagging where it was partially melted by the flame 
(Figure 16).  A major contributor to the containment of the fire was the very tight 
packing of the components inside the case.  This result is a notable exception to 
the statement in the previous version of this document that “Obviously, if a 
container has walls made of flammable materials it cannot serve this purpose and 
should be evaluated according to the guidelinesR” 
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a. Pretest (Gore® vents on front face) 
 
 
 
b. Posttest (burned internal electronics and foam) 
 
 
 
c. Posttest (burned foam -- 80% free volume, 20% foam) 
 
Figure 13.  Simulated MPCV Avionics Box Flammability Test
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a.  Pretest (cover removed) 
 
 
 
 
b.  Posttest, cover removed after test 
 
 
Figure 14.  Apollo Entry Monitor System 
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a.  Pretest 
 
 
 
 
b.  Posttest 
 
 
Figure 15.  Apollo Rotational Controller 
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Figure 16. Camcorder, External View (Internal Ignition, Post-Test) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17.  Camcorder, External View (External Ignition, Post-Test) 
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When the same camcorder was tested with the igniter external to and impinging 
on the case, it burned vigorously and was effectively destroyed (Figure 17).  
However, the addition of a 4-mil fluoroelastomer coating to the exterior of the 
case has been shown to protect it from external ignition.  Commercial off-the-
shelf camcorders with ABS cases and this protective coating were flown routinely 
on the Space Shuttle from the early 1990s.   
 
Note:  For most payload applications, uncoated camcorders can be controlled for 
flammability through stowage (Section 5.0).  The fluoroelastomer coating is 
required only for applications where camcorders are mounted in the crew areas 
and powered by the vehicle power supply for extended periods.   Flammability 
testing of individual camcorders is not necessary, provided the design is similar to 
previously flown units. 
 
 
8.7   Special Cases 
 
When a hardware design doesn’t fit any of the examples given above, it may still 
be possible to clear the hardware through a carefully designed unique test 
program.  An example is the testing that was conducted for the ISS commercial 
off-the-shelf vacuum cleaner power cable, intended to plug into the ISS power 
inverter.  The vacuum cleaner itself (Figure 18a) is constructed of flammable 
materials but considered acceptable, because it has no credible internal ignition 
sources, is always tended by the crew while in use, and is always stowed away in 
a nonflammable container when not in use.  However, the power cable is a 
standard household vacuum cleaner cable with PVC wire insulation wrapped in 
cotton, and all inside a PVC jacket (an intentionally damaged section of cable is 
shown in Figure 18b).  Although this construction is designed to be nonflammable 
in air, it is certainly flammable in the ISS enriched oxygen environment and 
damaged wiring is common for such household vacuum cleaner cables.  Since a 
high current passes through the cable with serious potential to act as an ignition 
source, this cable was considered to be a significant potential fire risk. 
 
Because of this concern, a test program was conducted to determine whether 
ignition could occur as a result of an electrical short between damaged vacuum 
cleaner cable wires.  The testing showed that such ignition could occur (Figure 
18c), but only with cable damage so severe that it would have been detected long 
before it reached the point where it could cause ignition (see test reference 18).  
The configuration in Figure 18b, which resulted in ignition, had significant lengths 
of bare conductors with frayed cotton looped into intimate contact with the 
conductors at the location of the short.  The test confirmed the expectations that 
ignition could occur, but the scenario was so extreme as to not be credible and 
the cable was accepted without modification. 
 
Replacing the cable with a nonflammable cable would have been a significant 
cost impact and would have severely impacted the intended ISS approach of 
minimizing hardware certification costs by purchasing commercial off-the-shelf 
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items and using them powered them through the inverter without modification.  
This cable would still have been unacceptable if it had been planned to be 
deployed unattended for long periods, because of the potential for ignition by 
possible external ignition sources.  However, the stowage approach that was 
already planned to control the vacuum cleaner flammability was adequate for the 
cable as well. 
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a.  ISS commercial off-the-shelf vacuum cleaner 
 
 
 
 
b. Damaged section of vacuum cleaner cable 
 
 
c. Burned cable post test 
 
 
Figure 18. ISS Vacuum Cleaner Cable Flammability Test
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Appendix A -- Test References 
 
1. WSTF 14-46333, “Charge Bluetooth® Speaker", NASA White Sands Test 
Facility.      
 
2. WSTF 14-46338, “Mini Bluetooth® Speaker", NASA White Sands Test Facility.    
  
3. WSTF 85-18799, "EZ502 Cordless Electric Screwdriver", NASA White Sands 
Test Facility.      
 
4. WSTF 84-17634, "Disposable Dishrack", NASA White Sands Test Facility.   
    
5. WSTF 79-11018, "WAVA Hose with Nomex Cover", NASA White Sands Test 
Facility.     
 
6. WSTF 78-10785, "Wet Wipe Dispenser with Disposable Towelettes', NASA 
White Sands Test Facility.     
 
7. ATR 142010A, “Flammability Test, Hermetically Sealed Container, Thrust 
Vector Servo Amplifier (TVSA)”, North American Rockwell Corporation, Space 
Division; April 12, 1968. 
 
8. ATR 142009, "Flammability Tests of Vented Container, Master Events 
Sequence Controller (MESC)", North American Rockwell Corporation, Space 
Division; November 27,1967.     
 
9. WSTF 80-13562, "Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) Flammability Unit", NASA 
White Sands Test Facility.    
 
10. WSTF 80-13561, "Proximity Switch Box MC452-0124", NASA White Sands 
Test Facility.          
 
11. TR-325-001, "Atmosphere and Ignition Effects on "Typical" Electronic Box and 
Contents", NASA White Sands Test Facility, December 14,1984.     
 
12. TR-325-002, "Atmosphere and Ignition Effects on "Typical" Electronic Box and 
Contents”, NASA White Sands Test Facility, November 30,1984.      
 
13. WSTF11-45093, Power inverter 120 V dc", NASA White Sands Test Facility.    
 
14. WSTF 13-46248, Flammability Testing on a Simulation Avionics Box 
 
15. ATR 142014, "Flammability Tests of Vented Container, Entry Monitor System 
(EMS)', North American Rockwell Corporation, Space Division; November 16, 
1967.     
 
 
 JSC 29353 
Page A-2  
16. ATR 142011, "Flammability Tests of Vented Container, Rotational Controller”, 
North American Rockwell Corporation, Space Division; January 3, 1968.     
 
17. WSTF 89-22852, "CCD-V9 Camcorder",  NASA White Sands Test Facility.          
 
18. WSTF 12-45702, “COTS Vacuum Cleaner Power Cord”,  NASA White Sands 
Test Facility.          
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Appendix B -- Specification References 
 
 
L-T-80    Tape, pressure-sensitive adhesive (aluminum backed)    
 
ANSI/NEMA-WC Standard for Aerospace and Industrial Electrical Cable 
 -27500   (formerly MIL-C-27500F, Cable, electrical shielded and 
unshielded, aerospace)     
 
SAE-AS-22759  Wire, electric, fluoropolymer-insulated, copper or copper 
alloy (formerly MIL-W-22759) 
 
SAE-AS-81044  Wire, electric, crosslinked polyalkene, crosslinked alkane-
imide polymer, or polyarylene insulated, copper or copper 
alloy    (formerly MIL-W-81044)
 JSC 29353 
Page C-1  
Appendix C -- Definitions 
 
 
Barrier, Fire -- An obstruction (such as a partition) that prohibits or tends to 
inhibit the propagation of burning.  May be internal or external in configuration.  
 
Break. Fire -- A gap, opening, or nonflammable material between flammable 
materials which would prevent propagation of burning.  
 
Containers. Sealed -- Containers that are enclosed adequately enough to 
preclude the replenishment of a combustible atmosphere under conditions of a 
fire.  
 
Containers, Vented -- Containers that are unsealed and permit atmosphere 
exchange.  
 
Containment. Fire -- The situation in which a fire and/or burning particles do not 
progress, in any manner, beyond the confines of a configuration.  
 
Flammable -- A material which fails to meet acceptance criteria when tested 
according to the requirements of NASA-STD-6001 (i. e., one that will burn more 
than 6 inches when ignited).  
 
Heat Sink -- A structure or panel of high thermal conductivity in intimate contact 
with a burning material which extracts sufficient heat by conduction to lower the 
temperature below the ignition point and extinguish burning. An effective heat 
sink could limit initial ignition.  
 
Ignition Source -- A source of heat sufficiently intense and localized to Induce 
combustion. For flammability considerations, any electrical wire or elevated 
temperature component is considered an ignition source.  Monopropellants, 
strong oxidizers, bases, etc. must also be considered.  
 
Nonflammable -- A material that meets the acceptance criteria when tested 
according to the requirements of NASA-STD-6001 (i. e., one that self-
extinguishes within 6 inches when ignited).  
 
Positive Igniters -- lgniters that produce a controlled flame.  
 
Propagation Paths -- The paths taken by a flame front external to (or within)an 
enclosure that represent fire paths between flammable materials.  They are not 
necessarily straight or coplanar.  
 
Void Space -- Unoccupied volume in a container 
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Appendix D -- Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
 
ABS acrylonitrile butadiene styrene  
 
ECTFE ethylene chlorotrifluoroethylene  
 
ETFE ethylene tetrafluoroethylene  
 
FEP fluorinated ethylene propylene  
 
mil milli-inch (0.001 inch) 
 
MUA materials usage agreement 
 
PBI polybenzimidazole  
 
PVC polyvinylchloride  
 
scfm standard cubic feet per minute  
 
TFE tetrafluoroethylene 
 JSC 29353 
Page E-1  
Appendix E -- Flammability Rationale Codes 
(from NASA-STD-6016) 
 
CODE RATIONALE 
101 Approved Materials Usage Agreement (MUA) Category I. 
102 Approved Materials Usage Agreement (MUA) Category II. 
103 Materials passed requirements when tested in configuration. 
104 Unexposed, overcoated, or sandwiched between nonflammable 
materials and no ignition source or propagation path.   
105 Minor usage (less than 0.1 lb (45 g) mass and 2 in2 (13 cm2) surface 
area); no propagation path or ignition source. 
106 Material is used in hermetically sealed container. 
107 Self-extinguishing in configurational flammability test per NASA-
STD-6001 test A.2.4, by test or analysis.* 
108 Off-the-shelf equipment having material acceptable in configuration; 
no ignition source or propagation path. 
109 Material not exposed; totally immersed in fluid; evaluated for fluid 
compatibility only. 
110 Material is acceptable when used on a metal substrate that provides 
a good heat sink.  Material considered noncombustible in this 
configuration by test or analysis. 
111 Material is flammable but is sandwiched between nonflammable 
materials with edges only exposed and is more than 2 in (5 cm) from 
an ignition source or more than 12 in (30 cm) from other flammable 
materials. 
112 Material is flammable but is unexposed or is overcoated with a 
nonflammable material. 
113 Material is flammable  but has a thickness less than 0.010 in (.25 
mm) and is sprayed or bonded to a metallic surface  greater than 
0.062 in (1.6 mm) thick. 
114 Material is flammable but is used in “small amounts” and is  
more than 2 in (5 cm) from and ignition source or more than 12 in 
(30.5 cm) from other flammable materials.  “Small amounts” for 
flammability may be quantified as follows:   
total weight less than 0.1 lb(45 g) and less than 2.0 in2 (13 cm2) 
surface area. 
 
 
 
* In SSP 30233, the rationale for this code is “Passes test No. 8 of NASA-STD-
6001, Flammability Test for Materials in Vented Containers, by test or analysis.”  
In NASA-STD-6016, the rationale is “Passes test No. 10 of NASA-STD-(I)-6001, 
Flammability Test for Materials in Vented Containers, by test or analysis.” 
However, Test 8 and Test 10 are cancelled in NASA-STD-6001B and replaced by 
a more generic supplementary test described in Appendix A.2.4. 
